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Microeconometric  analysis  of Mexican  industry  shows addi-
tional  investment  in public  infrastructure  produces  only a small
increase  in output. This suggests  that the policy  emphasis  in
Mexico  should  be on the  better  upkeep  of existing  infrastructure
to ensure the continuity  of public services  rather than on new
capital  investment.
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This paper specifies a microeconometric model  The long-run multiplier effect of public
(a restri' ted equilibrium framework) to estimate  infrastructure on output as measured by the
the impact of investment in public infrastructure  output elasticity of public infrastructure is
on private industrial profitability.  Empirical re-  positive but small.  Since public infrastructure is
sults based on time series data for 34 industries  also observed to have a smal  degree of comple-
characterize the Mexican industrial structure as  mentarity with both capital and labor, better
having involuntary unemployment, deficient  upkeep of the existing infrastructure would help
product demand, declining productivity growth,  improve the functioning of labor and product
increasing retums to scale, and short-nin excess  markets in Mexico.
capital capacity.  Aggregate technological
change over the period studied has been capital  From the private sector's perspective,
using and labor saving.  however, the long-run productivity of private
capital is much higher than the productivity of
Both labor and capital are underused in the  public capital. Therefore, new capital invest-
short run. This disequilibrium has hig!i effi-  ment in the public sector is nct recommended at
ciency costs that may be undernining Mexico's  this time and should be undertaken only to
intemational compctitiveness.  rectify any identified constraints imposed by the
inadequacy of infrastructure in the private
employment of private factors.
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preparation.I.  INTRODUCTION
The role of public infrastructure  as a factor  of production  in
stimulating economic growth and  influencing productivity of private
businesses  is well recognized  in economic  theory  and  formed  the  genesis  of
the World  Bank lending policies since  its inception, but  empirical
literature  addressing  this question  is limited.  A number  of studies  in
recent years have attempted  to examine the relationship  between public
spending and private investment (see e.g. Blejer and Khan 1984 and
Binswanger, 1988).  These studies  usually specify  a priv'  - Lnvestment
equation  in an accelerator or growth model framework ai...  jvernment
investment  with appropriate lag structure enters as a decerminant  of
private  investment  behavior. The  results  indicate  whether  or not  there  has
been  a posi.ive  relation-hip between public  spending  and  private
investment. Beyond  this question  and as a guide  to public  policy,  these
studies have  limited usefullness as they do not yield parameters of
interest  to public  policymakers.  For  example,  these  studies  have  not  been
able  to provide  evidence pertaining to the  following questions of
fundamental  interest  to  public  officials:
1.  What is the impact  of public investment  on private sector
profitabilLtJ?
2.  What is the desired  level  of public  capital  stock from the
private  sector's  perspective?
3.  What have been  the  limiting factors in private output
expansion?
4.  What are the elasticities  of factor substitution,  output
elasticities  of factors,  and  own  price  elasticities?
5.  What  are  the  returns  to scale  in  the  short  and  long  runs?
6.  Are  optimal  levels  of fixed  factors  held in the  short  run?-2-
7.  What are  the consequences of  inoptimal levels of fixed
factors  for  allocative  efficiency?
8.  What are the shadow  prices of capital  and infrastructure?
Lance Taylor (1979)  has argued  that shadow  prices must be
derived  from a model that incorporates  the interactions  of
the industrial  sector  with the rest  of the  economy  and that
in Little-Mirrlees and UNIDO methods for computation of
shadow  prices,  "Too  much  ratiocination  is  required  to get  the
prices  and too  much  common  sense  may  be left  out."  (p.  205).
What are the rates  of return  to the industrial  sector  from
its direct  and  voluntary  investment  in capital  and from its
involuntary  contributions  towards the provision  of public
infrastructure?
10.  What  has  been  happening  to  total  factor  productivity  growth?
Answers  to the above  questions  are  helpful  in carrying  out  both  a
review  of existing  public  programs  for  deficit  reduction  as  well as ranking
potential  investment  opportunities. Unfortunately  these questions  could
not be handled in an investment  equation  framework  and require  precise
description of  the cost structure of the  industrial sector in the
jurisdiction to be studied.  A production function approach to these
questions would be of limited usefulness  as it would yield technical
efficiency  parameters only and would not be able to handle allocative
efficiency  questions due to absence of prices.  To estimate  the cost
structure,  one is faced  with several  modelling  strategies. Broad  choices
in  this  respect  include  static,  dynamic  or implicitly  dynamic  formulations.
A static  equilibrium  framework  is easier  to implement  but is useful  only
under  a special  set  of circumstances  when  there  are  no indivisibilities  and
rigidities in the system  and adjustment  is costless  and instantaneous.
These conditions  are unlikely  to be fulfilled  in any practical  economic
environment  let  alone in a developing  country. This framework  would lead
to misleading  policy  prescriptions  if quasi-fixed  factors  indeed  diverge
from their static equilibrium levels in the short run.  Thus it is- 3 -
essential  that  appropriate  tests  of static  equilibrium  must  precede  actual
estimation  in this framework. For example  Berndt  and Fuss (1982)  argues
that  total  factor  productivity  growth  measures  are  usually  in  error  because
researchers  have failed  to take into  account  the impact  of divergence  of
fixed  factors  from their static  equilibrium  levels  (see also Schankerman
and Nadiri  1984).  In an explicitly  dynamic  framework,  on the other  hand,
factor disequilibrium  is recognized  and adjustment  costs are explicitly
moJelled  and an expectation  hypothesis  is  specified. The adjustment  costs
are usually  treated  as internal  to the firm  and a specific  cost structure
usually  of a quadratic  form is imposed  to make the model mathematically
tractable. This framework  enables  the  researcher  to trace  out the  dynamic
adjustment  path  under  specified  conditions  (see  Pindyk  and  Rotemburg  1983).
A major limitation  of this framework is that if divergence  from full
equilibrium  arises from external  factors  rather  than internal  adjustment
costs  then  the  specified  framework  would  not  be helpful. Furthermore,  much
is lost in imposing a smooth adjustment cost structure for convexity
because  it rules  out  interesting assymmetries arising from market
imperfections and  institutional constraints.  An  implicitly dynamic
formulation  such as the one  presented  here (hereafter  called  a restricted
equilibrium  framework) recognizes these constraints and provides a
relatively  simple  and flexible  -tructure  to focus on principal  research
concerns by  sidestepping  complicated  questions regarding the path of
dynamic adjustment.  A  restricted  equilibrium  approach  recognizes  that
quasi-fixed factors may diverge from their equilibrium  values due to
factors  which are beyond the control  of an individual  firm in the short
run.  Short run optimization  in this framework  takes  place  over flexible
factors  only  and  is  conditional  on the  given  levels  of fixed  factors,  input
prices and technology. Adjustment  costs are considered  external  to the- 4  .
firm  in the  short  run  and  are  not  explicitly  modeled. This  latter  approach
is more suitable  for application  in a developing  country  context  sucn as
Mexico where almost  all markets  are imperfect  and the sources  of factor
disequilibrium  are  more  likely  to  be external  to  the  firm. Mexican  economy
is saddled with credit rationi..  price controls  and reg,.lations.  In
addition,  divergence  of public  infrastructure  from  the  level  desired  by the
industrial  sector  could not be traced to internal  adjustment  costs but
rather  due to external  factors.  The industrial  sector  must transmit  its
preferences  pertaining  to the desired  level  of infrastcucture  indirectly
through  the  political  process  (see  also Dalenberg  1987).  Thus the source
of divergence  in the desired  and actual  level  of public  infrastructure  is
external to an industry  and only a restricted  equilibrium  framework  is
appropriate  in modelling the role of public infrastructure in the
production  process.  The restricted  equilibrium  framework  uses parameter
estimates from the restricted  variable  cost function  and derived input
demand  functions  to implicitly  trace  out the total  cost structure  in the
short  and long runs.  Thus it is able to provide  a complete  picture  of
short run disequilibrium (restricted equilibrium) and long run full
equilibrium  configurations.  The approach,  however,  is deceptively  simple
in appearance  as its implementation  is quite  difficult. Often  the system
of non-linear  equations  does not converge.  Furthermore,  in solving  for
optimal  levels  of quasi-fixed factors and elasticities, analytical
derivatives  might be  intractable  and resort must be  taken to numeric
solution  methods.  This study  adopts  the  restricted  equilibrium  framework
to examine  questions  posed  in the  introductory  paragraphs  of this  paper.-5-
II.  A DISEQUILIBRIUM  MODEL  OF PRODUCTION
We postulate  a model  of production  with short-run  disequilibrium
in factor  demands  due to absence  of an instantaneous  adjustment  mechanism.
The  instantaneous adjustment mechanism may be hampered by costs of
investment  and disinvestment,  regulatory  control and imperfections  of
credit narkets,  inoptimal  size of public  infrastructure  and institutional
constraints. Since  the objective  of this  paper  is to quantify  the impact
of public  infrastructure on private sector productivity, the above
mentioned  rigidities  which  are  helpful  in  explaining  the  current  levels  and
evolution  of fixed factors  are side-stepped  to keep the model tractable.
This strategy  also enable  us to keep the model flexible  as no specific
structure  is imposed  on the dynamic  adjustment  behavior  of fixed factors
(see  also  Diewert  1986). A restricted  cost  function  approach  has  been  used
recently  by  Schankarman  and  NAdiri  (19QR1,  TOalenbere  (1987);  and  Morrison
(1988)  to analyze  short  and  long  run  factor  demands  and  costs.  This  paper
extends their approach to a description  of production  technology  which
incorporates interactions  of public and private sectors - as well as
technical  change.
Consider  a model of production  with labor (L) and intermediate
inputs (M) as flexible factors and private capital (K) and effective
(available  for  use)  public  infrastructure  (GE)  as quasi-fixed  factors  (Z).
Firms  optimize  over flexible  factors  and treat  quasi-fixed  factors,  input
prices  and technology  (T) as given.  Output (Q) is treated  as a random
variable.  This description  of production  technology  is captured  by the
following  short-run  variable  cost  function  [VC(  )]:-6
(1)  VC - VC(PL,PM,Q;  K,GE,T)
where  PL - price  of labor
PM  - price  of intermediate  inputs.
It may be noted that in the above formulation,  public infrastructure  is
viewed  as an important  quasi-fixed  input  in the production  process.  The
firms  have little  control  over this input  in the short  run.  It exhibits
characteristics  of an impure  public  good.  Firms  pay for  the  provision  and
maintenance  of public  infrastructure  through  property  taxes.  licenses  fees,
levies,  income  taxes  and  user  charges. They  share  its  use  with  other  firms
and consumers.  In the long run, however,  the firms exercise  sufficient
influence in the determination  of public infrastructure. For example,
Downs  (1957)  argues  that  produe.rs  arA  more  likely  to havy-  a  gresaer
i% fluence on the level and composition  of public infrastructure  than
consumers (p. 254). The  long run  influence of firms on the public
infrastructure  is  carried  out in a number  of ways (see  also  Dalenberg  1987
and  Boadway  1983); These  include:
a.  Direct  lobbying  pressures  through canvassing  and
political  contributions;
b.  Voting  with the Feet.  This could  be in the form of
actual  behavior  or a threat  to consider  such a move.
Intense interjurisdictional  competition  for tax bases
ensures  that  such  threats  are  not  taken  lightly;  and
c.  Several  channels  of indirect  influence  also  ensures  that
industry  preferences  are  taken  into  consideration  in the
determination  of public  infrastructure.  For  example,  it
is generally  perceived  that  the  level  of  local
employment  and public  services  quality  depends  upon the
profitability  of  local  business.  If  public
infrastructure  is  perceived  by median  voter  to influence-7-
business  prifitability  in a  positive  fashion,  then  he is
likely  to choose  the  level  of  public  infrastrtuature  that
maximizes  producer  welfare.  Furtherm're,  most
politicians  recognize  the  health  of the  local  economy  is
an important  factor  in  their  re-election  campaign. Thus
they must work to provide the level of infrastructure
desired  by the  commercial-industrial  sector.
An important  qualification  to the  above  points  is in order  here.  Publ.ic
infrastructure  competes  with social  spending  and the  choice  of the  latter
will be favored  especially  if there  is anti-business  sentiment  as may be
the  case  in  much  of  Mexico  (except  for  the  North).
(2)  and  G'E  - C  (I)@
where  G - Public  Infrastructure
I  - Index  of  use
9  - A parameter  indicating  degree  of publicness  of
rublic  infrastructure
The estimated  value  of 9 will indicate  how public  infrastructure  is  viewed
in terms  of its "publicoess". A value of 0 would indicate  it is a pure
public  good  and  a  value  of 1,  on the  other  hand,  would  suggest  that  it is  a
private  good.
The function VC(.) is assumed to be monotonically  non-decreasing  and
concave  in PL and PM,  non-decreasing  in  Q and  non-increasing  and  convex  in
K,  G and  T.
By Shephard's lemma, conditional  demands for variable  factors  would be
represented  by the  following:K  8 -
(3)  aVC  VCp  (PLPO;  KGE,T)  - L
and  similarly
(4)  VC  _  (PP,,Q;  K,G  ,T)  - M 8PM  '  G
The  associated  short-run  cost  function  would  be represented  by
(5)  SC  - VC(.)  +  PK *  K +  PG - GE
PK  - user  cost (service  price)  of  private  capital.
PG  - user  cost  of  public  infrastructure.
The envelope  conditions  specify  static  equilibrium  levels  of quasi-fixed
factors  (K,G)  as follows:
(6)  - VCK (PL,P  KQGEST)  -PK
(7)  - VCG (PLPM,Q;  aGE  T) -G
The above conditions state that a static  equilibrium  is obtained  when
savings in variable  costs from the employment  of last unit of a fixed
factor  just equals  its  rental  rate.  Note that -VCG  represents  the shadow
price of public infrastructure  or revealed implicit  price or marginal
willingness  Lo  pay for such service  by a private  producer.  PC, on the
other  hand, is a calculated  service  price  of public  infrastructure.  This-9-
latter  price is based on the acquisition  price  of public  infrastructure,
opportunity  cost  of funds  and  depreciation.  Condition3  (6)  and (7)  also
guarantee  that 8SC  and  S  equal  zero  when  K  - and  E  GE.
The envelope conditions imply the following  demand functions  for fixed
factors.
(8)  K - K(Q,PLoPH  PK,PG  T)
(9)  GE-  GE (Q;PL,PMHPK'PG  J)
Thus the  long-run  cost  function  could  be represented  by
(10)  C  - VC[QPLPMK()  G(.)]  +  PK *  +  PG  GE
- C(Q,PL,PH,PK,PG,T)
The  duality between production and cost functions ensures that the
structure  of production  can be completely  represented  by the restricted
cost  function  specified  in  equation  (l). The  following  sections  specify  an
empirical  framework  to estimate  the restricted  cost function,  carry out
tests  of static  equilibrium,  estimate  elasticities  of substitution  both in
the short  and long run and present  estimates  on the rates of return  to
fixed factors.  An analysis of short run productivity  growth is also
presented.- 10  -
III. MODEL  SPECIFICATION
The model is specified in full translog form because of its
flexibility in functional form and its demonstrated  superiority  over
alternate  functional  forms  in  Monte  Carlo  studies  (see  Guilkey  et al 1983).
A  translog restricted variable cost function treating labor (L) and
Intermediate  inputs  (M)  as flexible  factors  (i,  J-1  ...  n - L, M) and  capital
(K)  and public  infrastructure  (G)  as quasi-fixed  factors,  Z (i,  j-l...  m -
K, G) is specified  below:
n  m
(11)  lnVC  - a0  +  Z ailnPi +  E  ilnZi+  G0 *  lnI  +  aQlnQ
0  i-l
2  n n  m m
+  0.5  y,Q..(lnQ)  +  0.5  Z  E 7ij  lnPilnPi  + 0.5  Z  E 6ij lnZilnZ
ii  i  jii 
22  m
+  0.5  6GG  ° (lnI) +  E  6JG *  ° *  lnZ  lnI
n  n m  n
+*  pQiln  Q ln Pi  +  Z  E  pij  ln  Pi ln Zi  + E  PiG  9  ln Pi lnI
m
+  Z  IiQ  Q  ln  Q  Z  +  wGQ  *  °*  lnQ *  lnI
i  ~  ~  ~  ~  ~~~ 
+  0  T + 12  0T  T2  + 0T  T ln  Q + E  TPT  in 
m
* Z  TZ Tln Zi+  0TGG  . T . lnI  +  c
i  i- 11  -
Cost minimizing  derived  demand  equations  for flexible  inputs  are obtained
from (8)  by logarithmically  differentiating  this  function  with  respect  to
flexible  input  prices  and  applying  Shephard's  lamma  (1953),  i.e.  !VC  - X
The  derived  demand  equations  obtained  from  this  process  can  be written  as:
PiX,  n
(12)  a  ln VC/a ln P  i  -1  si - a  i+  PQiln  Q  +  Zij  PJ
ITPx  j
in~  ~  ~  ipx
+  ij  Pln  +  iG  lnI  +  TP T +  cs,  Vi
J  i
Given the translog  variable  cost function  specified  in equation  (11),  the
envelope  conditions  specified  in  equation.s  (6)  and (7)  could  be written  as
follows:
(13)  PK + (e  lnVC/K)  (K+  SK  lnK +  PLKlnPL
pMK  ln Pm +  6KG ln  G + 6KG *  ° *  lnI
KQ *  lnQ  +  KT T)  - O
(14)  pG +  (e  /G) - (PC  + pLG *  ln  PL  + PMG *  ln  PM
+ 6 KG  ln  K + 6  lnG  +  *  °  lnI
GQ  lnQ  +  GT  *  T)  - O- 12
RESTRICTIONS
A "well-behaved"  cost  function  must satisfy  the  following  conditions:
(a)  Hicks-Samualson  Symmetry  Conditions: This condition  ensures  that the
cross-partial  derivatives  are  equal.
-ij  - ijj  Slutsky Symmetry
and  8ij - 6ji
(b) Monotonicity:  The function  must be an increasing  function  of input
prices  i.e.
OllogVC  2: 
Ologpj
This condition  cannot  be imposed  but must be satisfied  by the estimated
function.
(c) Linear  homogeniety  conditicns  for ingut  prices i.e. when all factor
prices  are doubled,  the total cost will  double.  It can be shown that
linear  price  homogeneity  implies  the following  restrictions  (see  Brown  and
Christenson,  1981  and  Eakin  and  Kneisner,  1988).
n
(15)  - where  i  - PL,PM
n  n  n  n  n
i  ij  i'  ni  Qi  Pij  Z  TP  - °v- 13  -
(d)  Other  assumptions  usually  employed  by empirical  studies  include:
Homotheticity:  This restriction  is imposed  to ensure  separability  of
factor  prices  and output  in a cost function  and that  optimal  factor
combination is independent  of the scale of output.  A homothetic
production  function  has  a linear  expansion  path.
Homogeniety:  This condition implies that elasticity of cost with
respect  to output  is a constant  (equal  to one for  constant  returns  to
scale).
Neut  21 Technical  Change:  This implies  that technical  change  does  not
affect  factor  intensity.
The above  restrictions  are  usually  imposed  for  simplicity  and tractability
but they severely  limit the usefulness  of the model results  for policy
analysis. The restrictions  associated  with homotheticity,  homogeneity  and
neutral  technical  change  are  not imposed  in this  study.
IV.  THE  DATA
The  data  on  wages,  employment,  value  added  and  private  capital  for
34 industries  for  the  period  1970-1983  are  obtained  from  Jarque  (1988). In
addition  aggregate  data  on public  capital  stock  in electricity,
communications  and transportation  sectors are extracted from the same
source.  These series  are supplemented  by data on output, intermediate
inputs  and prices  from various  government  publications. Index  of use is
defined  as a specific  industry's  output  divided  by the  gross  output  of all
industries.  Implicit  price indices  for labor,  capital  and intermediate
inputs  are constructed  using industry-specific  constant  and  current  value
cost series.  Divisia  price and quantity  indices  (see Diewert  1976)  for
aggregate  public  capital  stock  are then  computed  using  price and quantity- 14 -
series  mentioned  above. User  ccat  of capital  and  infrastructure  series  are
developed.  Details  on the data and the formulae  used are available  from
the  author  upon  request.
V.  MODEL  PROCEDURES  AND  RESULTS
An investigation  into  divergence  of quasi-fixed  factors  from  their
static  equilibrium  levels  is of critical  importance  in  model  selection  and
interpretation  of results. r)r  this  purpose  an econometric  test  developed
by Schankerman  and  Nadiri  (1984),  (see  also  Hausman,  1981  and  Holly,  1982),
is utilized.  An  intuitive basis for this test is presented in the
following  paragraph.
An Econometric  Test of Divergence  of Quasi-Fixed  Factors  From  Their  Static
Eguilibrium  Values.
Consider  (A 0 as a vector  of parameter  estimates  obtained  from the
variable  cost function  alone  and 0l  and  P2 as parameter  estimates  based  on
the derived  demand  functions  for flexible  and quasi-fixed  inputs.  Under
the null hypothesis  both fi  and 02 would form a subset  of coefficient
estimates represented in Po.  Partition Po as 68  i.e. the parameters
appearing  in VC(-) only and P9  as those appearing  in quasi-fixed  input
demand  functions.  In a restricted  equilibrium  framework,  the maintained
hypothesis  (Ho) is that  02  - P9.  A constrained  estimate  of the system  of
equations (11) - (14) say P  is consistent  under Ho but not under an
alternate  hypothesis  (H 1) whereas  an  unconstrained  estimator  of the  system
say  o  is consistent  under  both  Ho and  H1. The standard  test  compares  log-
likelihood  function  under  0  and  p.  The  standard  likelihood  ratio  test,
however,  breaks  down  if one  or more  regressors  appear  only  in the  quasi-- 15 -
fixed input  demand  functions  i.e. the levels  of quasi-fixed  factors  are
influenced  by  some external  factors not  represented  in the VC(-)
formulation. If this  were to happen  the  unconstrained  estimator  would  be
inconsistent  as equations  (13) and (14)  would be misspecified  under the
alternative  hypothesis  and  this  misspecification  manifests  itself  through
the  covariance  of the  error  terms  used in the  estimation  of 0.  A proper
test, therefore,  should compare asymptomatically  efficient constrained
estimator,  p  from  the  full  system  (equations  (11)  to (14))  under  the
restrictic  '  that  P2  - P9 to  another  unconstrained  estimator,  0  from  a
system  of equations  that  includes  variable  cost  and  flexible  input  demand
equations  only.  Note  that  p  is  consistent  with  both  Ho and  H1 whereas  0
is consistent  under  Ho only.  This test  can  be carried  out  by computing  A
statistics  as follows:
(16)  A -(  - P)' [COV(P) - co0V(w)l  (  -)
A is  a chi-square  deviate  wi..h  degrees  of freedom  being  equal  to the  number  of
restrictions  embodied  in P2 - 09.  Tests of divergence  of all fixed  factors
from  their  static  equilibrium  values  involve  comparing  the  computed  value  of A
with the  tabulated  value  of chi-square  with  K degrees  of freedom. Testing  for
all  fixed  factors,  the  computed  value  of  A  greatly  exceeds  the  tabulated  value
of X2os with 14 degrees of freedom.  Therefore the null hypothesis  that
divergence  of fixed factors  from their  static  equilibrium  levels is due to
random variations only is strongly  rejected.  Two further  tests are then
carried  out  to see  if  only  the  subsets  of  K or  G are  at their  optimal  values.
In these  cases,  the  coefficient  vector  p  is  defined  as  before  but  p  is
obtained  equations  (11)  - (12) plus  the subset  of  (13) and  (14)- 16  -
corresponding  to fixed factors  being tested.  Table 1 presents  the test
statistics  which suggest  that  whereas  the  hypothesis  that  capital  is  close
to  its static equilibrium level is strongly rejected, divergence of
infrastructure  from its  static  equilibrium  level  is considered  simply  as a
random  variation.
Estimation
The fu'.l  translog  model specified  in equations  (11) - (12) and
(14) is estimated using Gauss-Newton  methods (see J;.dge  et. al 1985
pp.  951-974 for details).  Equation (13) was excluded due to tests
described  earlier.  Note  that  the  constant  returns  to  scale  or
homotheticity restrictions are not  imposed in the specified system.
Symmetry  and  price  homogeneity  conditions,  on the  other  hand,  are imposed.
Price homogeneity  condition ensures that if all input prices were to
double,  cost would double  holding all fixed inputs  and output  constant.
Imposition  of these  restrictions  meant that  out of 36 coefficients  in the
system, only 22 were independent.  Public infrastructure  specification
makes  the  system  of equations  non-linear  in  parameters, Furthermore,  it is
likely  that error  terms  across  equations  will be correlated. Thus a non-
linear  estimation  method  which  incorporates  corrections  for
heteroskedasticity  would  be  appropriate.  Davidson-Fletcher-Powell
algorithm meets  these criteria and  is employed here.  A  convergence
criterion  of .00001  is specified. The  algorithm  uses  an iterative  process
to  maximize  the  log-likelihood  function. Parameter  estimates  are  presented
in  Table  2.  The  estimated  VC(.)  satisfies  the theoretical  conditions  that
it  be monotonically  non-decreasing  and  concave  in  PL and  PM,  non-decreasing
in Q and  non-increasing  and convex  in K, G and  T.  Increases  in both the- 17 -
Table 1:
HAUSMAN-HOLLY-SCHANKERMAN-NADIRI  TESTS FOR STATIC
EQUILIBRIUM OF QUASI-FIXED FACTORS IN MEXICAN INDUSTRIES
Degrees of  Critical
Hypothesis  A-Statistic  Freedom  X.05  Results
Both Capital and Public  2364.6  14  23.7  Strongly
Infrastructure at  Rejected
static equilibrium levels
Capital only at static  1711.2  7  14.1  Strongly
equilibrium level  Rejected
Public Infrastructure  10.3  7  14.1  Accepted
at static equilibrium
level
Notes:  Please note that the test allows for random errors in the determination
of static equilibrium values.- 18  -
Table 2:
ESTIMATED PARAMETERS FOR THE NON-LINEAR SYSTEM
OF SIMULTANEOUS  EQUATIONS
(476  observations)
Coefficient  Estimated Value  T-Ratio
0o  .098342  2.0
AXL  .338280  11.6
PK  -.087747  -3.4
PG  -.038984  -5.1
(XQ  .833540  28.5
7QQ  .020939  0.6
7LL  -.001054  -0.03
6GG  .068149  2.4
'SKK  .005201  0.9
6KG  -.002671  -1.5
PLQ  .032266  3.0
PLK  .012689  1.8
PLG  -.005241  -0.7
FKQ  -.072449  -6.4
1GQ  .054220  1.9
OT  -.222330  -2.5
OTT  .234580  2.8
OTQ  .100910  4.7
OTP  -.038736  -1.4
OTK  .039011  1.9
OTG  -.004796  -0.7
THETA  .995000  39.3
Log - Likelihood Function =  1243.989- 19  -
quasi-fixed  factors  reduce  variable  costs  of the  industry  (OK  <  0, PG <  0)
with additions  to capital having  a larger  impact  than  that from  increases
in the stock  of infrastructure  (PK  >  PG).  The estimated  value of 6, the
degree  of publicness  of public  infrastructure  parameter  is statistically
significant  and is close  to unity  indicating  that  public  infrastructure  is
viewed more like a private good or a  "congested"  public good with the
industry  bearing  full  costs  of the  part  of the  network  it  uses.  Parameter
estimates  further  suggest  that  the  technological  change  in  Mexico  over  the
period  studied  has  been  labor  and  infrastructure  saving  (j6TP  <  0,  TG < 0)
L
and  capital  using  (OTK  >  0)  variety.
Parameter estimates in Table 2 are utilized to estimate the
implied  static  equilibrium  levels  of capital  and infrastructure  which in
turn are used to retrieve  Allen  elasticities  of substitution  (measures  of
the  curvature  of  the  production  isoquant  and  hence  pairwise
substitutability  of  inputs while  holding  output  constant),  price
elasticities  of demand and other characteristics  of the long run cost
function  (see  Brown  & Christensen  1981  and  Schankerman  and  Nadiri,  1984  for
details  of the  elasticity  formulae).
The elasticities  of substitution  estimates  presented  in Table 3
suggest  that there  are substantial  opportunities  for factor  substitution
both in the short and long runs.  These estimates imply that labor,
intermediate  inputs  and  capital  are  competitive  (rivals  in demand)  factors
both in the  short  and long  runs.  Public  infrastructure  on the  other  hand
shows  a  weakly  competitive  relation  with  intermediate  inputs  (in  both  runs)
and  weak complementarity  with  labor  (in  both runs)  and  capital  (in  the  long
run only).  Labor shows  a slightly  higher  degree  of complementarity  with- 20 -
Table 3:
ALLEN ELASTICITIES OF SUBSTITUTION (AES)
IN RESTRICTED AND FULL EQUILIBRIUM
(asmptotic standard  errors in parentheses)
Restricted Equilibrium  Full Equilibrium
Partial AES  Partial  AES
at Z  at Z*  Full AES
(oij)  oij)  ai)
¢LL  -1.965  (0.391)  -2.432  (0.241)  -2.634  (0.435)
aIMM  -0.509  (0.072)  -0.564  (0.083)  -0.905  (0.113)
aLM  1.005  (0.167)  1.021  (0.077)  0.965  (0.222)
0LK  0.822  (0.145)  0.833  (0.123)
O'LG  -0.373  (0.758)  -0.305  (0.297)
O'MK  0.933  (0.060)  1.128  (0.062)
aMG  0.194  (0.314)  0.594  (0.151)
aKK  -2.209  (0.190)
GGG  -1.758  (7.875)
aGK  -0.127  (0.094)
VC *VC
(0j)  |  iff i, j  e Variable Factors
'j  Z=Z0  1i  j  zero otherwise
(o*  p  IVc  Vc ..
(U..j) |  =  jl  iff i  e  Variable Factor
I  z*  i  zero otherwise
jF  Ci  C.
ij  C.  C.- 21 -
the infrastructure  in the short run as opposed  to the long run.  This
result  may  be  due  to  the  fact  that  a  certain  minimum  level  of
infrastructure  is  absolutely  vital  to employment  generation  in the  private
sector.
Table 4 presents estimates  of conditional  own and cross price
elasticities of factor demands.  Estimates indicate that labor and
intermediate inputs are more responsive  to factor price changes than
capital  and infrastructure. Cross  price  elasticities  of private  factors
(L,  M and  K) with the  public  factor  (G)  are  very  small. The  estimated  own
price  elasticities  confirm  "le  Chatelier  Principle"  which states  tlbat  own
price response  of variable  factors  should  decrease  in absolute  value  with
the increase  in the  number  of factors  that  are  quasi-fixed. Short  run  own
price elasticities  of flexible factors are smalle. in magnitude than
comparable  long  run  values.
Scale  Economies  and  Productivity  Growth
Several  useful  measures  that characterize  the cost structure  of
the  Mexican  industries  are  presented  in Table  5.  These  parameters  suggest
that the short run cost elasticity is smaller than the long run cost
elasticity.  This is  consistent  with  earlier  findings  that  in  the  short  run
excess  levels  of quasi-fixed  factors  are being held.  Note that under  a
static  equilibrium  framework,  short  run  cost  elasticity  is always  equal  to
the long run cost elasticity. Thus a static  equilibrium  framework  would
overstate scale economies in the long run in the presence of excess
capacity  in the shor_-run. The production  structure  exhibits  increasing
return  to scale  both in  the  short  and long  runs.  Lon&  run  productivity  of- 22 -
Table 4:
SHORT  AND LONG RUN CONDITIONAL (PARTIAL)  OWN AND
CR-'S PRICE ELASTICITIES OF FACTOR DEMANDS
(asymptotic  standard errors in parentheses)
Short Run  Long Run
Restricted Equilibrium  Full Equilibrium
'ij  I Z  Z°  j  I  I 
ILL  -0.472  (0.146)  -0.637  (0.150)  -0.711  (0.117)
Vmm  -0.234  (0.076)  -0.299  (0.062)  -0.480  (0.060)
VLM  0.462  (0.146)  0.541  (0.150)  0.442  (0.117)
VML  0.241  (0.076)  0.276  (0.062)  0.260  (0.060)
ILK  0.132  (0.032)  0.133  (0.020)
VLG  -0.015  (0.023)  -0.012  (0.012)
IMK  0.149  (0.013)  0.181  (0.010)
1MG  0.008  (0.009)  0.024  (0.006-
1KL  0.225  (0.033)
'GL  -0.082  (0.080)
IKK  0.598  (0.132)
IGM  0.314  (0.080)
VGK  -0.020  (0.015)
'KG  -0.005  (0.004)
'KR  -0.353  (0.030)
G7GG  -0.070  (0.315)
pi  I  0  z=  (°i  Pe Sj pij  IZ  Pij
Fij  =  (°ij  )  . S  S
'ii  jj- 23 -
Table  5:
COST  AND  OUTPUT  ELASTICITIES  AND SCALE  ECONOMIES
IMPLIED  BY THE  NON-MINIMUM  COST  FUNCTION
(asymptotic  standa.d  errors  in  parentheses)
Parameter  Estimate
Output  Elasticity  (long-run)  of:
Public  Infrastructure  (CQG)  .035  (0.012)
Physical  Capital  (EQK)  .254  (0.006)
Cost  Elasticity:
sr
Short  Run  (ecQ)  0.692  (0.060)
lr
Long  Run  (EcQ)  0.861  (0.028)
Slope  of the  Average  Cost  Curve:
Short Run  (fsr)  -.308
Long Run  (flr)  -.139
Scale  Economies
Short  Run  (SCE)sr  1.445
Long  Run  (SCE)lr  1.161





srQ  - lnSQC  ,  lr  3  ltlC  asr  3(,sr  -lr  lrn(cQ-1
CQ  aInQ .CQ  G  enQ  *  RCQ'  CQ
*  6  -~~D  *  (SCE)r =SCEr-l  lr EQG  8  G  Q'  QKC  8K  Q '(CQ)  (SE)Q1r- 24 -
capital in private production  is estimated  to be much higher than the
productivity  of public infrastructure.  Finally,  short-run  measures  of
productivity  growth  show a declining  trend  over the  period  studied.  PGQ
indicates the rate at which output  grows over time holding all inputs
constant. It is  defined  as follows  (see  Callan  1988):
(17)  pGQ  _  (alnVC)/(alnvc)
This measure shows an average annual decline of 1.3% in productivity
growth.  A  related  measure,  PGX, measures  the common rate at which all
inputs  can  be reduced  while  holding  output  constant  and  is defined  as:
(18)  PGX  - _(3lnVC)/[(  _  (alnVC)
Short run productivity  growth  indicated  by this  measure  shows an average
annual  decline  of 1.1%.  A third  measure,  PGX-G,  assumes  that  the  marginal
impact  of public  infrastructure  on the variable  costs  of the industry  is
equal  to zero  and  then  estimates  the  common  rate  at  which  all  inputs  can  be
reduced  while  holding  output  constant. Mathematically,
(19)  PGX-G  - -(a'nVC)/,l  -(al"VRC), BlnV  alnvC
This measure shows an average annual decline of  1.2% in short run
productivity  growth.25 -
Disegullibrium  in  Factor  Demands  and  Allocative  Efficiency
Parameter  estimates  of the restricted  variable  cost function  are
used to retrieve  static  equilibrium  values  of K and G.  These estimates
suggest  that excess  stocks  of capital  and infrastructure  are held by the
Mexican industries.  Capital and infrastructure diverge from their
equilibrium  values  by 32.0  and 8.6  percent  respectively. Excess  capacity
in infrastructure  is not statistically  significant  and its  divergence  from
its  desired  level  is  due to  random  variations  only.  The  findings  of excess
capacity  in fixed  factors  are further  collaborated  by estimates  of shadow
prices  of capital  and  infrastructure  yielded  by the  variable  cost  function.
Shadow  price  of a fixed  factor  is defined  as reductions  in variable  costs
resulting from an addition of one unit of the fixed factor.  Table 6
relates  shadow  prices  of capital  and  infrastructure  to their  service  prices
(user  cost) and also to real interest  rate.  Factors  would be at their
static  equilibrium  values  if the  shadow  price  of a fixed  factor  equals  its
service  price i.e. marginal  cost equals  savings  in variable  costs.  The
shadow  price  of capital  and infrastructure  are estimated  to be 4.9 and  4.4
respectively,  whereas  their  service  prices  are estimated  to be 6.7  and  4.6
respectively.  Tnus  the  shadow  price  of  capital  is significantly  lower  than
its  service  price  giving  a clear  indication  of overinvestment  in structure,
machinery  and equipment. The shadow  price  of infrastructure  on the  other
hand, though  smaller  is only slightly  lower  than its  service  price.  Note
that  the  service  price  calculations  take  into  consideration  factors  such  as
the acquisition  price of capital,  real discount  rate,  depreciation  rate,
income  tax  rates,  indirect  taxes,  tax  credits  and subsidies. Table  6 also
relates  shadow  prices  of fixed  factors  to real non-tax  cost of borrowing- 26 -
Table  6:
INDICATORS  OF SHORT  RUN  DISEQUILIBRIUM  IN FACTOR  DEMAADS  AND  IMPLIED
EFFICIENCY COSTS REVEALED  BY THE RESTRICTED  VARIABLE  COST FUNCTION
Indicator  Estimate  Comments
K/K*  1.320  32?  excess  capacity
GIG*  1.086  8.6?  excess  capacity.  This  diver-
gence  is  due to  random  variations





r(C  - C.1
(_  min) l  °  0.094  9.42  of total  costs  are  due  to in-
t  cmin  j  optimal  levels  of quasi-fixed
factors  in the  short  run.
FK/PK  0.731  Additional  capital  investment  would
be uneconomic  in  the  short  run.
FK/r  0.555
FG/PG  0.957  Additional  infrastructure  invest-
ment  would  be  warranted  only  to
rectify  any  identified  constraints
imposed  by the inadequacy  of infra-
structure  in the  private  employ-
ment of  private  factors.
FG/r  0.499
Notations:
Superscript  *  :  Static  Equilibrium  Value
K  :  Physical  Capital
G  :  Public  Infrastructure
C  :  Total  Cost
Cmin  :  Minimum  cost  with optimization
FK  :  Shadow  price  of capit  ,l
FG  :  Shadow  price  of public  infrastructure
r  :  Real  interest  rate
PK  :  Service  price  of capital
PG  :  Service  price  of infrastructure- 27 -
alone.  This comparison  shows  a dramatic  divergence  of shadow  prices  from
costs  of borrowing.
Finally,  the existence of excess factors imply  significant
efficiency  costs for Mexican industries.  Allocative  inefficiency  index
presented  in Table 6 suggest  that  on the average  9.4%  of total  industrial
sector costs are due to in-optimal  levels  of fixed factors  being held.
Such a  large efficiency cost would be detrimental to international
competitiveness  of  Mexico.
Rates  of Return  to  Quasi-Fixed  Factors
Table 7 presents  estimates  of ex-post  internal  rate  of return  to
quasi-fixed  factors  implied  by the  restricted  cost functions  under  varying
assumptions  regarding  the gestation  lag  between  the investment  in a fixed
factor  and its impact  on VC(.)  and the  speed  at which  output  price  adjusts
towards  the  new level  of average  cost.  The  rates  of return  to capital  and
infrastructure  presented  in Table  7 have  been computed  as the solution  to
the  following  non-linear  equation  derived  by Schankerman  and  Nadiri  (1984):
(20)  OVC  T  rrr 
(20)  - az  - e (p  + A +  -g)  - e (A-g)(r+p)
where  p  - marginal  net (internal)  rate of return to
investment  at time  zero (1970).
- gestation  lag  between  the  investinent  and its
impact  on  VC(.).
g  - rate  of growth  of  output  demand.
X  - rate of adjustment  of output  price towards
the  new  level  of average  cost.- 28 -
Table  7:
EX-POST  INTERNAL  RATE  OF RETURN  TO QUASI-FIXED  FACTORS
IMPLIED  BY THE  RESTRICTED  COST  FUNCTION
(a)  CAPITAL
r4  0  1  2  3  5
0.25  .057  .058  .060  .061  .063
0.30  .061  .062  .063  .064  .066
0.35  .063  .065  .066  .067  .069
0.40  .066  .067  .068  .069  .071
0.50  .069  .070  .071  .072  .074
(b)  PUBLIC  INFRASTRUCTURE
0  1  2  3  5
:'4
0.25  .055  .057  .059  .060  .062
0.30  .059  .061  .062  .063  .066
0.35  .062  .064  .065  .066  .068
0.40  .065  .066  .067  .068  .070
0.50  .068  .070  .071  .072  .073
Notes:
'r  is  the  gestation  lag  between  the  investment  and  its  impact  on  VC(e)
X output  price  adjustment  towards  new  level  of average  cost.
Note  that  #  varies  directly  with  'r  and  X  if  p <  r  and  p  varies  inversely  with  r
and  X  if  p  >  r.- 29 -
*  - rate  of depreciation.
r  - market  interest  rate  (real).
The  left  hand side  of equation  (20)  measures  the  marginal  benefit  of a  unit
of investment  and the  right  hand side the  marginal  cost  of such investment
taking into consideration  discounts for implementation  delay, rate of
change  of output  price,  capital  gains  due to the rate of growth  of real
output,  impact  delay  after investment  is in  place  and opportunity  cost  of
funds.  Parameter values used in this estimation  are r  - 0,1,2,3,5;
X  - 0.25,0.30,0.35,0.40,0.50; g - .05 (based on data for 1970-83);
X  - .05; r - .088 (average  for the period 1970-83).  Table 7 presents
estimates  of ex-post  rates of return to the industrial  sector from its
direct  and voluntary  investment  in capital  and involuntary  and indirect
investment  in infrastructure. Returns to capital  vary from 5.7 to 7.4
percent  and  returns  to infrastructure  range  from  5.5  to 7.3  percent. There
are  hardly  any discernible  differences  in the two  returns  and the  private
sector seems to have earned comparable  returns from its investment  in
physical capital and  from its involuntary contributions towards the
provision  of public  infrastructure.  Note  also  that  these  returns  are  lower
than  the  opportunity  cost  of funds  thereby  reconfirming  the  excess  capacity
findings.
VI.  PRINCIPAL  FINDINGS  AND POLICY  IMPLICATIONS
The  following paragraphs briefly recapitulate the principal
findings  of this study and discuss their economic  significance. These
findings  are:- 30 -
1.  The level  of  public  infrastructure  in  Mexico  is  close  to the  level
desired by the industrial  sector.  This suggests  that policy emphasis
should  be on the better  upkeep  of the existing  infrastructure  to ensure
continuity in the existing level of services rather than new capital
investment.  Tanzi  (1988)  has  also  stressed  this  point.
2.  Public infrastructure  is weakly complementary  to both private
capital  and labor.  Labor,  capital  and intermediate  inputs  on the other
hand,  are observed  to be competitive  factors. Long run multiplier  effect
of public  infrastructure  on output  as measured  by the  output  elasticity  of
Dublic infrastructure  is positive, significant  but very small.  These
results suggest  that better upkeep of the existing  infrastructure  would
have  a  positive  impact  on labor  and  product  markets.
3.  Both labor and capital  are observed  to be underutilIzed  in the
short  run.  Factor  demand  response  to input  price changes  is seen to be
quite  limited.
4.  Technical  change  has been labor  saving  and  capital  using  variety
and  productivity  growth  has shown  a declining  trend  in  the  short  run.
5.  Rates of  returns to the industrial  sector  from its direct and
voluntary  investment  in private  capital  and its involuntary  and indirect
investment  in public infrastructure  have been roughly comparable.  An
important  explanation  for this peculiar  result  has been offered  by the
excess  capital  capacity  finding  discussed  later.- 31 -
6.  Shadow  prices  of both public  and private  capital  are lower  than
their  service  prices  in the short  run  but in the  long run  productivity  of
private  capital  is estimated  to be much higher  than the productivity  of
public  capital  from  the  private  sector's  perspective. These  results  follow
from the findings of excess capacity  for private capital  and a random
variation  of  public  infrastructure  from  its  static  equilibrium  value  in the
short  run.
7.  Short run  factor market disequilibrium with  excess capital
capacity. In the  presence  of  excess  capacity,  an increase  in investment  in
fixed  factors  leads  to a decrease  in  average  variable  cost  but an increase
in average  total  cost.  This is a remarkable  finding  of this paper.  The
notion  of excess  capital  capacity  in  Mexico  has  been alluded  to  by Banco  de
Mexico (1986b),  Levy (1988)  and Cardoso  and Levy (1988)  but without  any
substantive  evidence.  In recent  years the Bank of Mexico  has conducted
surveys  of industrial  concerns  to reflect  on this question.  1982 is the
earliest  year data on installed  capacity  is available  from these  surveys.
Banco  de Mexico  (1988)  indicates that in the  first half  of  1982,
respondents  indicating  excess  installed capacity outnumbered those
indicating deficient capacity  by a margin of 33%  (see p. 24).  The
existence  of excess  capacity  has interesting  implications. In an economy
with involuntary  unemployment  induced  by excess  capacity,  an increase  in
indirect  taxes could lead to a further  contraction  of aggregate  demand
through  its  negative  effect  on  disposable  incomes  and  profits.
Furthermore,  Poterba,  Rotemberg  and Summers  (1986)  have demonstratedthat
in such  a setting  a balanced  budget  shift  from  direct  to indirect  taxation
leads  to a reduction  in employment  as well as output.  in tne  presence  of
excess  capacity,  export  subsidies  and selective  trade  barriers  can  have a- 32  -
positive  impact  on trade  balance  without  inducing  inflationary  tendencies
in the economy.  Furthermore,  with excess  capacity,  an increase  in public
spending  is likely  to have a positive  impact  on private  output (see  Levy
1988,  p. 3).
Excess  capacity  in  Mexico  might  have occurred  due to one or more
of the  following  reasons:
a.  Subsidies to caDital: In equalizing after tax rate of
return  to investment  in  various  assets  firms  may  overinvest
in the  subsidized  asset. In the  presence  of tax  incentives
firms  in Mexico  might  have overinvested in physical
capital.  Ebrill (1984)  shows that the relative  cost of
capital  in  Mexico  has  been lower  than  many  other  developing
nations.
b.  Technical  Change:  Excess  capacity  could  also occur if the
technological  change  gives  some advantage  to new capital.
In such a case installation  of new capacity  could take
place  before  the  old  capital  is  retired  (see  Chenery  1952).
c.  ￿  The  Mexican economy is highly regulated.
Conservative  estimates  suggest that nearly two-thirds  of
domestic  production  is subject  to one form or another  of
bureaucratic  controls.  These controls  take a variety  of
forms  and  include price  controls,  credit rationing,
licensing, quantitative  restrictions,  trade restrictions
and exchange  controls.  A regulatory  environment  creates
strong incentives  for firms to seek approvals  for plant
sizes  larger  than their  short  run  requirements.  This is a
natural consequence  of high transaction  costs associated
with bureaucracic approval  processes.  Larger requests
often have a greater  chance  to qualify for a fast-track
approval process.  Furthermore,  in a controlled price
setting,  regulatory  authorities  usually recognize  capital
as the appropriate  base for the allowed  rate of return
calculations.  It therefore  pays  for  a firm  to inflate  this
base  to seek a price  increase.  In the economics of
regulation literature, this is commonly known  as the
Averch-Johnson  effect. Excess  capacity  may  also have  been
an outcome  of strategic  behavior  on the  part of some large
producers  to  seek  closure  of  the  industry  for  new
investment  to  retain/create  a degree  of  monopoly  power.
d.  Sector  specific  caoital:  Excess  capacity  could  also occur
if the capital  was industry  specific  and large  costs  were
associated  with its disinvestment. In such a case excess- 33 -
capacity  in declining  industries  can  coexist  with  deficient
capacity in the growing industries.  In Mexico export
industries  might have inadequate  capacity  whereas import
competing industries  might have built excess capacity.
Excess  capacity  may  also  be the  result  of a large  number  of
sub-optimal  size  plants  in a given  industry. These  plants
may  be  underutilized  but  serious  disruption  costs
associated  with disinvestment  may prevent replacement  of
these small  plants  by a large  optimal  size  plant.  These
questions  needs  to  be explored  in future  empirical  work  on
this  subject.
e.  Scale  economies:  Scale  economies  also  create  incentives  for
excess  capital  capacity. At a theoretical  level,  Weitzman
(1982, 1988) shows that increasing  returns to scale is
synonymous  with excess capacity.  This happens because
indivisibilities  to physical and human capital provide
incentives  to firms to choose  a plant size larger  than
their current or immediately future run requirements.
Chenery  (1952) also  argues  that  in  the presence of
economies  of scale,  excess  capacity  will occur even with
perfect foresight.  This will happen if the new vintage
capital  is relatively  more cost effective.  The evidence
presented  in  this  paper  suggests  that  significant
unexploited  scale  economies  exist  in  the  Mexican
industries.
f.  Trade  rezime:  Overvalued  exchange  rate,  exchange  controls,
anti-export  tariff regime, import controls,  tax evasive
behavior,  and  uncertain  political  And  business  climate  also
encourage  investment  in physical  assets  to realize  capital
gains. All the  above  factors  are  an important  part  of  most
analyses  of the performance  of the  Mexican  economy  in the
seventies and eighties (see Balassa 1985, 1988a,  1988b,
Dornbusch  1988,  and  Cardoso  and  Levy  1988).
g.  Product demand ExRectations: Finally and  importantly,
excess  capacity  in Mexico  might have been the result  of
buoyant expectations  regarding the growth in aggregate
demand and these expectations  were not realized  due to
severe  strains  on the economy  caused  by servicing  a high
level  of foreign  debt.  Increases  in taxes  on consumption,
restrictive  wage policies, tight monetary policies and
dramatic reductions in public investment programs  in
particular  and  overall  public  spending  in general  to  reduce
the deficit and service debt might have contributed  to
aggregate  demand contraction in Mexico  in the early
eighties. Cardoso  and  Levy (1988)  blame  severe  contraction
in aggregate demand induced  by the above policies  as a
source of negative growth,  zero net investment,  capital
flight  and falling  real  wages in Mexico  during  the  period
1982-1985.- 34  -
8.  Industrial  efficiency  costs  associated  with the short  run factor
market  disequilibrium  are  estimated  to  be quite  high  and  may  be undermining
Mexico's  internmational  competitiveness.
9.  Increasing  returns  to scale  with higher  returns  in the  short  run
than  in the long run:  Higher scale economies in the short run are
indicative  of  short  run excess  capital capacity.  The  growth and
development  literature  suggests  that increasing  returns  to scale  could  be
experienced in the initial stages of development.  Empirical results
presented  in this  paper are supportive  of this  proposition. This finding
implies that the static  equilibrium  constant  returns  to scale paradigm
where under  Say's law supply creates its own demand would  lead to
misleading  policy conclusions  for an economy  whose industrial  structure
conforms  to  a  contradictory  paradigm  of  increasing  returns  to  scale.  Note
that  scale  economies  that  are  external  to  individual  firms  but  internal  to
an industry  are  compatible  with  perfect  competition.
Increasing  returns  to scale  is a subject  of growing  theoretical
interest  in recent  years.  There  is a greater  realization  in the  academic
literature  now than it existed  less than a decade  ago tlhat  in the real
world scale  economies  may be a more prevalent  phenomenon  than is commonly
recc'gnized. For example,  Weitzman (1982, 1988) demonstrates  that the
existence  of unemployment  is inconsistent  with constant  returns  to scale
and  perfect  competition.
Increasing  returns to scale has important  policy implications.
For  example,  the  presence  of increasing  returns  to scale  suggests  that  real
wages  will  behave  in a procyclical  fashion  and the  classical  argument  that- 35 -
involuntary  unemployment  will  be eliminated  by downward  pressures  on money
wages  would not  hold water.  Furthermore, in such an environment,
deficiency  in aggregate  demand  manifests  itself  in lower  levels  of output
being produced at higher per unit costs.  Under increasing  returns  to
scale,  equal  pay for  equal  work provisions  induce  a greater  reduction  in
workforce than warranted by the decline in aggregated demand.  With
increase  in demand,  higher  employment  can  take  place  with constant  or even
rising  money wages if there is excess  capital  capacity.  In this latter
case, marginal products of labor and capital increase as newly hired
workers  bring idle  machinery  into  operation  (see  also Lindbeck  and Snower
1988, Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987, and Summers 1988).  Procyclical
behavior  of real  wages  is confirmed  by the  Mexican  data (see  Levy  1988  and
Dornbusch  1988).
The standard  constant  returns  to scale,  perfect  competition  trade
theory  result that a home country  export  subsidy  must make the foreign
country  better  off is contradicted  when there  are scale  economies  and/or
imperfect  competition. In the  latter  case  a strong  case  for  a small  export
subsidy  could  be made (see  Markusen  and  Melvin  1988,  pp.  249-257). Krugman
(1984)  at a theoretical  level  shows  that when the scale  economies  are of
the nature  of dynamic  "learning  by doing," protected  home country  domain
allows  accelerated  accumulation  of sales  experience  and  marketing  know-how
and its timely  conversion  to reduced  costs  to achieve  a competitive  edge
over foreign  competition.  Thus the existence  of scale ecot.omies  could
imply  policy  prescriptions  which  are radically  different  from  the standard- 36 -
theoretical  results  in  which  we have  been  immersed  for  a long  time. A
quote  from  Blinder  (1988)  provides  a  befitting  prologue  to  this  discussion.
Blinder  writes,
"Thus  the difference  between  the  long  run  equilibrium
results  that  we  know  and  love  (and  teach  to  our  young)
and the short  run disequilibrium  results  that  people
actually  experience  are  no  more  quibbles.  They  may  be
fundamental.  And  that  may  be  one  reason  why  our  advice
so  often  falls  on  deaf  ears."  (p.  12).- 37 -
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